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If the Federalists’ conception of federalism and the value 
of a central government was victorious over the Anti-
Federalists’ conception—now known as “confederalism”—
in 1789, the depth and scope of this victory has only 
expanded through the course of history (Storing and Dry 
1981; MacDonald 1963). The conventional view—accurate 
in my opinion—is that the New Deal not only executed 
the Federalists’ vision of a stronger and more expansive 
federal government but also went beyond it, altering the 
balance of power between the federal and state govern-
ments and effectively ending the doctrine of “dual sover-
eignty” that had existed until then (Corwin 1950, 1-24; 
Mettler 1998). Attached to this conventional view is the 
interpretation that the Progressives were the forerunners 
of the New Dealers, partners in crime and descendants of 
the Federalists in their partiality to the powers of the fed-
eral government over those of the states (Mann 1963; 
Graham 1967; Dionne 1996; Derthick and Dinan 1999). 
I challenge this neat liberal–Progressive connection, a 
result of ex post facto reasoning, in this article.
The Progressive scholar and Pulitzer Prize winner 
Vernon Parrington (1927, i) freely admitted in the fore-
word to the first volume of Main Currents, “[T]he point of 
view from which I have endeavored to evaluate the materi-
als, is liberal rather than conservative, Jeffersonian rather 
than Federalist.” He meant “liberal” in the eighteenth-cen-
tury sense. If this observation seems odd today, it is 
because later generations of scholars have been too quick 
to draw the connection between the Progressive case 
for a stronger central government and the New Deal’s 
delivery of it. Yet if we unpacked what the Anti-
Federalists were for rather than cast them in the crude 
terms of merely what they were against, there are striking 
parallels to Progressivism worth exploring.
It would be difficult to deny that the Progressives initi-
ated the bureaucratic state-building trajectory that the 
New Deal would follow, but it would be equally difficult 
to argue that the Progressives would have welcomed New 
Dealism as the perfect fruition of their ideals. After all, 
the Progressives had their eyes set on dismantling a party 
state and replacing it with a more efficient and responsive 
one. This negative thrust of Progressivism is sometimes 
understated, yet here is where its debt to Anti-Federalist 
political thought might be discerned. If hindsight is 
twenty–twenty, we cannot understand the Progressives 
only according to what became of their ideas in the future 
which they could not have foreseen. It may be helpful to 
understand Progressivism also in terms of what they bor-
rowed and emulated from the first Americans before 
themselves who had dared challenged the wisdom of the 
founding and Madison’s “new science.” And when we 
see that Progressivism traces some of its roots to the most 
unlikely of places, Anti-Federalism, we may come closer 
to unpacking its enigmatic philosophy. Here then is my 
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two-part thesis: First, what unified the various strands of 
Progressive thought was its fundamental revulsion of the 
party state—the regnant state that preceded the modern 
bureaucratic state. When we focus our attention on this 
negative goal of Progressivism, we can then perceive its 
kinship to the Anti-Federalists’ antistatism of the eigh-
teenth century that had, we sometimes forget, also 
rejected one state in favor of another. Second, as the Anti-
Federalists appealed to precepts of classical republican-
ism to justify their opposition to the Federalist constitution 
and the structure of a new American government, so too 
did the Progressives in arguing for the abolition of the 
party state. In particular, both shared and articulated a 
mutual commitment to (1) simple government (rather 
than the complex “new science”), (2) the common good 
as a preinstitutional reality (rather than one that emerges 
from interbranch deliberation), (3) democracy (rather 
than a fear of it), (4) direct and responsive government 
(rather than indirect and representative government), 
(5) fear of elite rule (rather than fear of demagoguery), 
(6) civic education (rather than the assumption of self-
interest), and (7) cultural homogeneity (rather than hetero-
geneity as a solution to faction in a large republic).
Anti-Federalism, Progressivism, 
and Antistatism
Anti-Federalism and Antistatism
The Anti-Federalists are back in vogue, but only after a 
150-year hiatus.1 Other than an isolated body of scholar-
ship tracing the endurance of Anti-Federalist thought into 
the Jacksonian era (Ellis 1987; Cornell 1989; Aldrich and 
Grant 1993), there had been little if any work tracing 
their impact on American politics until scholars revived 
their interest in classical republicanism as a critique of 
postwar liberalism and offered the intellectual backdrop 
to the Reagan revolution (Wood 1969; Pocock 1975; 
Rahe 1992). In 1981, when Ronald Reagan declared that 
“government is not the solution to our problem” but 
instead that “government is the problem,” he inaugurated 
a political revolution that would reintroduce the repack-
aged Anti-Federalist ideas of “New Federalism” and the 
jurisprudential doctrine of “original intent” into main-
stream politics. That same year, Hebert Storing  published 
The Complete Anti-Federalist, the largest compilation of 
Anti-Federalist writings yet, and only the third.2
It is unlikely that Anti-Federalist political philosophy 
died with Jacksonian democracy, only to be triumphantly 
resurrected by Reagan. Instead, it found refuge in the 
most unsuspected of places. Framed exactly between the 
founding and the Reagan Revolution, the Progressives 
repackaged the antistatism of Anti-Federalist thought to 
decry and replace the late nineteenth century “state of 
courts and parties” with a new bureaucratic state 
(Skowronek 1982). The idea that the Progressives bor-
rowed heavily from the Anti-Federalists sounds ridicu-
lous on first blush because of the textbook view that the 
Anti-Federalists were our first antistatists, and the 
Progressives the first statists. While not entirely incor-
rect, such a view also misses the uniquely American 
meaning of “antistatism,” which has been a bivalent idea 
in America as long as there were two levels of govern-
ment. The Anti-Federalists, after all, were not straightfor-
wardly against all or any state apparatus. They merely 
rejected the version presented by the Federalists. As 
Patrick Henry entreated, “We are come hither to preserve 
the poor Commonwealth of Virginia, if it can be possibly 
done: Something must be done to preserve your liberty and 
mine: The Confederation; this same despised Government, 
merits, in my opinion, the highest encomium.”3 Similarly, 
A Plebeian volunteered, “The importance of preserving 
an union, and of establishing a government equal to the 
purpose of maintaining that union, is a sentiment deeply 
impressed on the mind of every citizen of America. It is 
now no longer doubted, that the confederation, in its pres-
ent form, is inadequate to that end: Some reform in our 
government must take place.”4 Borne of political com-
promise, the Federalists’ invention of the new federalism 
separated American antistatism from its erstwhile parent, 
anarchism. Henceforth, antistatism was no longer a 
purely negative position (as anarchism is) against the 
state, but a bivalent stance in which hatred for one type or 
level of government is counterpoised with love for an 
alternative type or level of government. It is in this sense 
that we ought to understand Progressivism’s antistatism.
Progressivism and Antistatism
It is perhaps because we forget that an old “state of courts 
and parties” had to be demolished before a new bureau-
cratic state could be built that we have underestimated 
that part of the Progressives’ identity that might not be 
unreasonably characterized as antistatist. But separating 
Progressivism’s negative form its positive goals may 
well be of use in assessing Progressivism’s mixed record. 
In its negative project to displace the old state of courts 
and parties, the Progressives were very successful; but in 
its endeavor to build a modern, efficient state, it was more 
of a “lost promise.” When we separate Progressivism’s 
antistatist and statist impulse, we can make better sense 
of a movement that was both antiestablishment on one 
hand and yet top-down on the other, a movement that 
used “Hamiltonian means for Jeffersonian ends” (Mowry 
1946, 145).
The Progressives, to be sure, were partly responsible 
for history’s conflation of what they were for and against, 
for they understood that it sounds nicer arguing for 
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something rather than against another, and that it could be 
more diplomatic and politically persuasive to laud effi-
ciency, experts, and a bureaucratic state rather than to 
decry corruption, bosses, and the political machines. 
And so Herbert Croly erased the distinction between 
Progressivism’s positive and negative projects where he 
declared. “When a group of state or city officials effec-
tively assert the public interest against the private inter-
ests, either of the machine or of the local corporations, 
they are acting just as palpably, if not just as comprehen-
sively, for the national welfare, as if their work benefited 
the whole American people” (Croly [1909] 1989, 274).
Yet we see in Croly’s roundabout way of defining the 
indefinable “public interest” that Progressivism’s unify-
ing logic lay, ultimately, in its antinomy to the party state. 
Like the Anti-Federalists, the Progressives were social 
critics before they were social reformers. As Theodore 
Roosevelt put it, his was the age of “a fierce discontent 
with evil . . . whether in industry or politics” (McGeer 
2003, xiii). Hofstadter crisply articulated Progressivism’s 
antistatism when it announced that it was ultimately 
about “the complaint of the unorganized against the con-
sequences of organization” (Hofstadter [1955] 1959, 
214). The major consequence of organization that the 
Progressives were agitating against was the corrupt boss-
ism of the nineteenth century. As the Progressive histo-
rian Benjamin Parke De Witt recognized three tendencies 
that united Progressive thought, he chose to highlight that 
“[t]he first of these tendencies is found in the insistence 
of the best men in all political parties that special, minor-
ity, and corrupt influence in government—national, state, 
and city—be removed” (De Witt 1915, 4, emphasis 
added). Or as Woodrow Wilson lamented, “The govern-
ment, which was designed for the people, has got into the 
hands of bosses and their employers, the special interests. 
An invisible empire has been set up above the forms of 
democracy” (Wilson 1913, 35). By “invisible empire,” 
Wilson meant the party state, an elaborate regime of gov-
ernance coordinated by political machines, lubricated by 
the spoils system, and enforced by the courts. What 
Wilson called an “invisible empire,” the Progressive 
Party Platform called an “invisible government”:
Instead of instruments to promote the general wel-
fare, they [the two major parties] have become the 
tools of corrupt interests which use them impar-
tially to serve their selfish purposes. Behind the 
ostensible government sits enthroned an invisible 
government owing no allegiance and acknowledg-
ing no responsibility to the people. To destroy this 
invisible government, to dissolve the unholy alli-
ance between corrupt business and corrupt politics 
is the first task of the statesmanship of the day. 
(Progressive Party Platform 1912)
Almost every Progressive reform seemingly advocated in 
favor of the state may similarly be understood to have 
been animated by an antinomy to the party state. Indeed, 
understanding the Progressives’ antistatism can help us 
to understand the flip side of their more conventionally 
“statist” reforms. Consider the sixteenth amendment, so 
critical for the bureaucratic-statist agenda of New Deal 
liberalism and therefore easily mistaken as a reform in the 
Hamiltonian and not the Jeffersonian tradition. Critically, 
the Progressives were not hoping to expand the federal 
purse or the size of the federal government when they 
proposed and supported a constitutional amendment that 
would allow the federal government to levy income taxes 
on individuals. As Edwin Seligman, a Progressive expert 
on taxation and campaigner for the sixteenth amendment, 
freely admitted, “[T]he income tax is assuredly not 
needed for revenue purposes” (Seligman 1914, 635). 
Even if a boost in federal revenues was hoped for, it was 
not expected. According to Elliot Brownlee, “[V]irtually 
none of the income-tax proponents believed that the 
income tax would become a major, let alone the domi-
nant, permanent source of revenue within the consumption-
based federal tax system . . . and the idea that the tax 
would enable the federal government to grow signifi-
cantly was far from the minds of the drafters of the 1913 
legislation” (Brownlee 2004, 55).
Like so many Progressive reforms, their support of the 
sixteenth amendment was not motivated by a desire to 
increase the size of the federal coffers but to weaken the 
power of the political machines at the state and local lev-
els that benefited from the extant means of federal reve-
nue acquisition. It was titled “An Act to reduce tariff 
duties,”5 and not to create the federal income tax, and the 
Progressives supported the latter because they believed 
that tariffs, the “mother of all trusts,” were an odious sys-
tem of government revenue because they were the perfect 
implement for members of Congress playing the pork-
barrel, distributive politics of the nineteenth century 
(Brownlee 2004, 44). There were myriad opportunities in 
the complex tariff schedules for members from both par-
ties to offer subsidies (or penalties) to narrowly defined 
groups of constituents, and especially industrialists who 
were in cahoots with the politicians of the party state.6 
Incidentally, this is why the movement for tariff reform 
was so slow to organize from within the two major par-
ties. The Democratic Party was quicker to cry foul only 
because its constituents did not benefit as much from the 
transfer payments and in particular the Civil War pen-
sions the federal government, via the party machine, dis-
bursed from its tariff receipts.7
The Progressives also did not support a federal income 
tax to achieve redistributive outcomes along the lines of 
New Deal liberalism. Replacing the system of tariffs with 
state and local income taxes would have balanced the 
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burden of taxation between the rich and the poor or the 
farmer and the industrialist, but doing so would also have 
perpetuated the power of the political bosses. Instead, the 
Progressives looked to placing the power of the purse at 
the federal level and to extend the scope of federal gov-
ernment so that by putting the money and the action 
elsewhere, the political machines could be put out of 
commission. As Seligman explained,
Federal administration is apt to be more successful 
than state administration. Not only is it easier to 
secure expert assistance for the larger problems 
involved in national expenditure, but the contact 
between official and citizen is not so likely to have 
that intimate relationship which would exist in the 
smaller administrative sphere. Above all, the influ-
ence of the party boss and of machine methods is 
obviously less pronounced in proportion as the 
sway of governmental operations becomes broader. 
(Seligman 1914, 652, emphasis added)
When the Progressives advocated “efficiency,” then, 
they were not counterpoising the efficiency of the gov-
ernment versus the efficiency of the markets, as is con-
temporarily understood. Instead, efficiency’s antonym at 
the turn of the twentieth century was corruption. Consider 
the seventeenth amendment, which was not motivated so 
much by the pull factor of democracy but the push factor 
of corruption, which was, according to Roger Brooks, 
“the greatest evil” motivating the call for direct election 
of senators (Brooks 1987, 200). As one scholar reported 
in 1916 in the American Political Science Review, the 
seventeenth amendment “appealed to the people now not 
so much as a logical extension of democracy, but with far 
greater force as an expedient method whereby they could 
exercise more complete control over their state legisla-
tures” (Tanger 1916, 697). The Progressives understood 
that to dismantle the party state, they had to attack the 
root of the problem by divesting party bosses of their 
king-making power. And the problem of the Senate, 
according to Henry Jones Ford, was that it had become 
the “Diet of party lords” (Ford 1898, 270). As one advo-
cate of the amendment, Senator Albert Beveridge, 
lamented, “[T]he party boss has become more potent than 
the legislature, or even the people themselves, in select-
ing United States Senators in more than one State” (Little 
1991, 641). The proponents of the seventeenth amend-
ment understood that without the gift of office, there 
could be no quid pro quo in spoils. They saw the amend-
ment primarily as an assault on the party bosses who 
controlled the composition and preferences of state legis-
latures and only secondarily as an advancement of democ-
racy.8 Once again, the positive goal of the Progressives—in 
this case advocacy of direct democracy—can be 
understood only when set alongside its animating, nega-
tive thrust. That is why the heart of Progressivism is 
where it subtly parts company with modern liberalism, 
which is arguably more concerned with doing good than 
abolishing evil.
The list goes on. When the Progressives proposed 
direct primaries, initiatives, referenda, and recall, they 
were as much concerned with curtailing the nominating, 
agenda-setting, and tenure-administering power of the 
party bosses as they were with any positive goal such as 
the promotion of democracy.9 Even women suffrage, 
Progressives believed, could deal a blow to the party state 
because expanding the suffrage to citizens as yet unaffili-
ated to the political parties would increase the common-
good-seeking virtue quotient of the citizenry as a whole. 
This is why so many suffragists relied on the ideology of 
Republican motherhood to advance their petition for 
women’s right to vote, and why women groups paradoxi-
cally lost their political salience when suffrage was 
extended because women lost their claim to the moral 
high ground and became, like men, tainted participants of 
the party state (Harvey 1996).
If the Progressives were sometimes more enthusiastic 
about their negative project of abolishing the party state 
than they were with following through with their positive 
reforms, it could be because they were surer about what 
they were against than what they were for. If the con-
ventional understanding of the Progressives has empha-
sized their belief in what the government can do for society, 
it is worthwhile to remember that they also possessed a 
strong sense of what society can do for government. As 
Herbert Croly recognized, “[T]o nationalize a people has 
never meant merely to centralize their government” 
(Croly [1909] 1989, 273). The Progressive era saw the 
proliferation of what Eldon Eisenach has called “para-
state” institutions—churches, professional organizations, 
nonpartisan national magazines—to speak for “the col-
lective ends of the national community” rather than to 
promote the private ends of partisans. Again, the anti-
(party)-statist agenda is clear. As Eisenach observed, 
“Both organizationally and culturally, the institutions that 
consciously articulated and enforced claims of a national 
public good were established largely outside of formal 
governing institutions and in direct opposition to the most 
powerful informal governing institution of them all—the 
mass-based political party” (Eisenach 1994, 18). Indeed, 
the Progressives’ multipronged attack on the party state—
the federal government from the top and “parastate” 
organizations from the bottom—reveals the structure of 
their priorities. As Brian Balogh has argued, “New 
Liberals viewed unilateral intervention into the economy 
by the General Government as just one of many forms of 
associative actions. It was rarely their first choice for 
such action” (Balogh 2009, 364). If the Progressives were 
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willing to put their faith in science, in experts, in the civil 
service, in churches, or in the people—practically any-
thing or anyone but the party bosses—it could be because 
the Progressives were more successful as the antistatists 
of the nineteenth century than as the statists of the twen-
tieth century. The curious course of Progressivism and its 
diverse foci begin to take on a unity when set against the 
movement’s preeminent goal of displacing the “state of 
courts and parties.”
Classical Republicanism, Anti-
Federalism, and Progressivism
In the second half of this article, I aim to show that the 
Progressives launched their attack on the party state by 
appropriating many central tenets of Anti-Federalist 
political thought. They turned, in particular, to the theory 
of virtuous citizenship encapsulated in seven precepts 
that bear resemblance to the Anti-Federalists’ interpreta-
tion of classical republicanism. To aid in the points of 
comparison and contrast elaborated on later, Table 1 
summarizes what is to follow.
A Simple Government
The Progressives echoed the Anti-Federalist charge that 
the Constitution was written by and for aristocratic inter-
ests, a condition that the patronage-oriented party state 
did nothing to ameliorate but only exploited. It is no 
coincidence that Progressive historians were among the 
first scholars to offer a sustained critique of the Federalists’ 
constitution, which they saw as the defective underlying 
infrastructure of which the superstructure of the 
party state was a necessary part (Parrington 1927). The 
Progressive era was, after all, probably the first time in 
American politics when, on countenancing the political 
and economic influence of the Vanderbilts and the 
Rockerfellers, Madison’s hitherto ingenious argument of 
the benefits of “extend[ing] the sphere” in Federalist 10 
had lost its previous luster. When they saw that even a 
large republic was no defense against powerful factions 
or interests groups, the Progressives became skeptics of 
the “new science of politics,” and reverted back to many 
elements of the Anti-Federalist theory of republicanism. 
Because Progressives were now convinced that the 
Table 1. Comparing Federalist, Anti-Federalist, and Progressive Political Thought.
Federalist Anti-Federalist Progressive
A. Faith in institutional politics (a 
“new science of politics”)
Rejected “complex government” because 
responsibility was diffused and because 
virtue was found not via the interplay of 
institutions, but in citizens
Impatient at checks and balances, distrustful 
of institutional politics and the Newtonian 
interpretation of the Constitution
B. Believed that the common 
good emerges from the clash 
of ambition and factions.
The common good is a preinstitutional 
reality and exists prior to the coalescing 
influence of institutions
The common good has been lost in the clash 
of institutional politics; rather, it needs to 
be divined from the great mass of mankind
C. Distrustful of democracy and 
fearful of majority faction
Committed to democracy and did not take 
seriously the possibility of minorities in 
a small republic; attacked the Electoral 
College and Supreme Court as aristocratic 
institutions
Committed to democracy and critical of the 
courts and the onerous requirements for 
constitutional amendment
D. Faith in indirect government 
and representative 
government
Faith in direct government and closeness 
between representative and represented
Faith in responsive government and direct 
democracy; blurring of the distinction 
between the ruler and the ruled (e.g., 
Wilson’s “leadership by interpretation”)
E. Feared demagoguery 
more than demagoguery, 
committed to a government 
laws and not of men
Feared aristocracy more than demagoguery, 
willing to contemplate a “first man” if 
that meant a suitable counterweight to 
legislative leviathan
Feared rule by the party elite; oversaw the 
birth of the “rhetorical presidency”
F. Optimistic about the future 
wrought by the “new 
science,” confident that 
ambition could counteract 
ambition
Nostalgic about the past, advocated 
“seminaries of useful learning” so that civic 
virtue could be cultivated
Nostalgic of an America before the 
moneyed and partisan interests took hold; 
committed to education so that citizens, 
and not just party bosses, could become 
experts of administration
G. Embraced diversity as the 
solution to majority faction
Preferred homogeneity as the precondition 
for fellow feeling and the cultivation of civic 
virtue
Assumed homogeneity in the people’s voice 
as the superior alternative to the private 
agendas of the moneyed and partisan 
interests
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Federalists’ complex machinery could not do the job of 
promoting the common good, they proposed a return to 
simple responsive government, liberated from a system 
of checks and balances that served only to benefit the 
interests, to do the people’s work.
Even though the Progressives accepted the reality of a 
large republic, they concurred with the Anti-Federalists’ 
rejection of the complex government that was the brain-
child of Madison et al.’s new science of politics and 
most famously explicated in Federalist 10, and pre-
ferred instead a simple government.10 Denatus observed 
that “the constitution of a wise and free people, ought to 
be as evident to simple reason, as the letters of our alpha-
bet.”11 But in the Federalists’ constitution, A Columbian 
Patriot saw a “heterogeneous phantom.”12 Like the Anti-
Federalists, the Progressives had neither patience nor 
faith in Madison’s new science of politics for two reasons 
they shared. First, they opposed the Constitution’s system 
of checks and balances because they felt that the party 
state exploited the Constitution’s unwieldiness toward 
collective action. As A (Maryland) Farmer argued, com-
plex governments “seem to bid defiance to all responsi-
bility, as it can never be discovered where the fault lies.”13 
Complex government also meant irresponsible govern-
ment. As Centinel argued, “[I]f you complicate the plan 
by various orders, the people will be perplexed and 
divided in their sentiments about the sources of abuses or 
misconduct, some will impute it to the senate, others to 
the house of representatives, and so on, that the interposi-
tion of the people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps 
wholly abortive.”14 This lack of responsibility, for 
Woodrow Wilson, was the chief defect of the Constitution. 
He lamented, for example, that merit-based civil service 
reform was stymied by boss-controlled members of 
Congress who deployed log-rolling tricks to derail gov-
ernment for the common good. The imprint of Anti-
Federalism on Wilson’s political philosophy is unmistakable 
in this conclusion:
It is, therefore, manifestly a radical defect in our 
federal system that it parcels out power and con-
fuses responsibility as it does. The main purpose of 
the Convention of 1787 seems to have been to 
accomplish this grievous mistake. The “literary 
theory” of checks and balances is simply a consis-
tent account of what our Constitution makers tried 
to do; and those checks and balances have proved 
mischievous just to the extent which they have suc-
ceeded in establishing themselves as realities. . . . 
[The Founders] would be the first to admit that the 
only fruit of dividing power had been to make it 
irresponsible. (Wilson [1885] 1901, 284-85)
The Common Good  
as Preinstitutional Reality
The second reason why the Anti-Federalists and 
Progressives opposed complex government was borne of 
their political-epistemological belief that the common 
good existed as a monolithic, preinstitutional reality and 
their corresponding skepticism that an invisible institu-
tional hand could coalesce a multitude of competing 
interests toward the pursuit of the common good 
(McWilliams 1990, 22). Because the Anti-Federalists 
envisioned a simple and homogenous republic, they sim-
ply assumed that there would be a corresponding homo-
geneity of views within the polity, and hence it made 
sense to speak of a monolithic common good that existed 
prior to the coalescing influence of institutions. In con-
trast, the Federalists and their political descendants who 
have conceived of the American Constitution as a 
Newtonian, pluralistic entity did not believe that the 
common good reliably existed as prepolitical reality. As 
Madison recognized in Federalist 10, “A landed interest, 
a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest . . . grow 
up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into 
different classes, actuated by different sentiments and 
views. The regulation of these various and interfering 
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, 
and involves the spirit of party and faction in the neces-
sary and ordinary operations of the government.” 
Federalists, the forerunners to modern “interest group 
pluralists,” believed not only in the reality of competing 
interests but in the independent value of their Newtonian 
interaction in delivering democratic outcomes (Lowi 
1979). Madison, in Federalist 14, called the scheme of 
representation he proposed in the Constitution a “great 
mechanical power, by the simple agency of which the 
will of the largest political body may be concentrated.” 
Thus, for the Federalists, the common good had to be 
found. Consider the contrast in the Federalist and Anti-
Federalist attitudes toward commerce. In Federalist 6, 
Hamilton argued that “the spirit of commerce has a ten-
dency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish 
those inflammable humors which have so often kindled 
into wars,” and in Federalist 12 he advocated “multiply-
ing the means of gratification.” Although commerce was 
thought to be a source of antagonism and corruption for 
both Anti-Federalists and Progressives, the Federalists 
embraced it as a way of promoting virtue—which indi-
cates that they understood the common good not as a 
given reality but something to be cultivated.
In contrast to the Federalists and like the Anti-
Federalists, the Progressives assumed that there was such 
a thing as a prepolitical common good—they had to 
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because everywhere they looked, politics and political 
institutions were putatively corrupt—and refused to see 
America as merely a conglomeration of interests, but as a 
moral community. Put differently, the Progressives were, 
like the Anti-Federalists, more hopeful about the prospect 
of finding virtue in citizens than the Federalists were. As 
we have seen, the Progressives worried about an “invisi-
ble government” because they believed that the 
Federalists’ relocated faith in an invisible hand had cre-
ated the very conditions for the pick-pocketing hand of 
the party state to thrive. They could not see how an 
“invisible government” held together by partisan loyal-
ties could pull together what the Constitution pulled 
asunder and would have agreed with the thrust of 
Centinel’s rhetorical question: “If the administrators of 
every government are actuated by views of private inter-
est and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the 
community to be the result of such jarring adverse inter-
ests?”15 If anything, Progressives believed that party-
state politicians used the spaces created by the 
constitutional check and balances to play cat and mouse 
with the common good. This is why they rejected both 
the need for the Federalists’ system of checks and bal-
ances and the interest brokering operating norm of the 
party state. It is also why, incidentally, many Progressives 
parted company from the New Deal when its proliferat-
ing agencies no longer looked like a neutral regulatory 
state but a stakeout of organized interests and collaborat-
ing politicians (Hofstadter [1955] 1959, 302). Not even 
the highest science of politics could, in the Anti-Federalist 
and Progressive mind, turn ambition into virtue. Both 
believed that the complex system created by the Federalists 
was too smart by half.
Democracy
In contrast to the Anti-Federalists and the Progressives, 
the Federalists were wary of democracy; they did not 
trust in men enough and opted instead for a government 
of laws. As has often been stated, the Federalists wanted 
to “extend the sphere” because they feared that the 
majority in a small republic would tyrannize a minority; 
and the only way to avoid the problem was to create a 
republic large enough so that no majority could ever 
form, and to create a Supreme Court as a bulwark against 
majority tyranny. In striking at the central operational 
principle of democracy—democracy cannot work unless 
a mechanism of aggregating preferences can be found—
Madison in Federalist 10 was dealing as fatal a blow to 
democracy as he could muster.
If the Federalists were skeptical about human nature and 
perceived the need to channel ambition via a constitutional 
framework to turn vice into virtue, the Anti-Federalists 
were more insistent than the Federalists were on the clas-
sical republican belief that there was a fount of virtue in 
citizens that can and ought to be tapped. Sharing the Anti-
Federalist concerns about an unwieldy constitution dedi-
cated to the preservation of aristocratic interests, and 
further burdened by a party state incapable of transcend-
ing petty interests, the Progressives had no other option 
but to take their faith in citizens to Panglossian heights.
Because of their starting premise of a small and 
homogenous republic, the Anti-Federalists were oblivi-
ous or indifferent to the possibility of the tyranny by the 
majority and were far more comfortable with democracy 
than the Federalists were.16 This is why some Anti-
Federalists opposed the Electoral College, and most wor-
ried about the power of the Supreme Court to defend 
aristocratic interests. On the Electoral College, Republicus 
asked, “Is it then become necessary, that a free people 
should first resign their right of suffrage into other hands 
besides their own, and then, secondly, that they to whom 
they resign it should be compelled to choose men, whose 
persons, characters, manners, or principles they know 
nothing of?”17 Way ahead of his time, Cato similarly 
believed that “the representative of the people should be 
of their immediate choice” and worried that “by the man-
ner in which the president is chosen he arrives to this 
office at the fourth or fifth hand, nor does the highest 
vote, in the way he is elected, determine the choice.”18
A similar conviction in democracy led Anti-Federalists 
to warn (of the Supreme Court) that “those usurpations, 
which silently undermine the spirit of liberty, under the 
sanction of law, are more dangerous than direct and open 
legislative attacks.”19 The Progressives would have 
agreed with Brutus’s worry about the interpretive power 
of the courts and the provisions for constitutional amend-
ment: “In respect to certain fundamental provisions, 
which necessarily receive the most rigid interpretation on 
the part of the courts, it is practically unmodifiable. A 
very small percentage of the American people can in this 
respect permanently thwart the will of an enormous 
majority, and there can be no justification for such a con-
dition on any possible theory of popular Sovereignty” 
(Croly [1909] 1989, 36).
The Progressives clearly took a page from the Anti-
Federalists in their criticism of the Constitution. Even 
Herbert Croly, who was very sympathetic to the 
Federalists, criticized Alexander Hamilton, who he 
believed “was betrayed by his fears and his lack of faith” 
for believing that it was “necessary to bestow upon the 
central government the support of a strong special inter-
est.” “Instead of seeking to base the perpetuation of the 
Union upon the interested motives of a minority of 
Lim 39
well-to-do citizens,” Croly continued, Hamilton “would 
have been far wiser to have frankly intrusted its welfare 
to the good-will of the whole people” (Croly [1909] 1989, 
41). Progressives like J. Allen Smith repeated Patrick 
Henry’s objection to Article 5 and expressed the prevail-
ing Progressive view that by insulating the Constitution 
against amendment, the “framers of the Constitution 
deliberately intended to dethrone the numerical majority” 
(J. A. Smith 1907, 48). Smith went as far as to praise 
the amendment procedure set up by the Articles of 
Confederation (J. A. Smith 1907, 57).
Clearly, what was at the heart of Progressive criticism 
of the Constitution was the fact that it had been roped in 
to perpetuate the interest-protecting and status-quo-
preserving party state. Even more than the Anti-Federalists, 
the Progressives were wary of the power of the courts 
because of their belief that they were in cahoots with 
Congress—the spearheading branch of the party state—
to simply dispose whatever the latter proposed (Link 
[1955] 1967, 2:115). This is why Progressives were so 
strongly opposed, to paraphrase Stephen Skowronek, not 
only to the state of parties but also to the state of courts. 
Correspondingly, the Progressive Party Platform of 1912 
read, “The Progressive party demands such restriction of 
the power of the courts as shall leave to the people the 
ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of 
social welfare and public policy.”
Direct and Responsive Government
If the Federalists were at pains to prevent a majority, the 
Progressives—armed not with the new science of politics 
but the new sciences of society—were intent on divining 
and representing it, as we saw in the devolution of insti-
tutional power to citizens at both the state and local levels 
as a result of their direct democracy reforms (Marcus 
1971; D. A. Smith and Fridkin 2008). The Progressives 
did not fear the cacophony of heterogeneous voices in a 
large republic in part because they believed that the 
voices of citizens were drowned out by machine politics 
and bypassed by secret congressional committee hear-
ings, and in part because they assumed that their leaders 
(such as Woodrow Wilson) possessed the ability to lead 
them out of their self-regarding ways. Like the Anti-
Federalists, Progressives like Herbert Croly and Theodore 
Roosevelt tried to tie together public and private impera-
tives, though they did it differently under the banner of 
“nationalizing democracy.” They did not reify the public–
private distinction (Balogh 2009, 364). Similarly, we see 
in the Anti-Federalist theory of representation a blurring 
of the public–private distinction as well as the distinction 
between the ruler and the ruled—in Melancton Smith’s 
proposal that “representatives [should] . . . resemble 
those that they represent”20—just as we find a similar 
blurring of these distinctions in Woodrow Wilson’s 
“Leadership by Interpretation” (Ceaser 1979, 190). 
Indeed, it was the Progressive introduction of the “rhe-
torical presidency” as well as the primary nominating 
process that would culminate in modern plebiscitary 
presidents who have indeed, as the Anti-Federalist theory 
of representation prescribed, come to closely “resemble” 
those that they represent (Tulis 1987).
The Federalists, in contrast, believed that frequent 
recourse to the people would damage the reputation of 
government, believing that the ends of government are 
not always in line with the ends of democracy. In 
Federalist 49, Publius argued that “frequent appeals 
would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that 
veneration which time bestows on every thing.” Before 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson advocated their theories 
of moral and didactic leadership to bring together a nation 
of solipsistic individuals and to break the stalemate of 
partisan wrangling, the Anti-Federalists foresaw the need 
for “characters who have genius and capacity sufficient 
to form the manners and correct the morals of the people, 
and virtue enough to lead their country to freedom.”21
Fear of Elite Rule
The closeness in the Anti-Federalist and Progressive 
theories of leadership can be further highlighted with an 
understanding that the former were not uniformly against 
a strong executive. The Anti-Federalist fear of an elected 
king who would put the country through a frivolous pur-
suit of empire and glory was balanced by a perceived 
need to guard against a potential legislative leviathan at 
home. Some Anti-Federalists actually supported the cre-
ation of a strong executive to stand up to what they feared 
would be the aristocratic tendencies of the Senate. And 
so as James Monroe wrote, “With an executive organized 
on these principles, being independent of the legisla-
ture . . . I should be well content to intrust great pow-
ers.”22 The Federal Farmer, probably the most widely 
read of the Anti-Federalists, went as far as to advocate “a 
first man”—clearly the Anti-Federalist incarnation of the 
modern, Progressive presidency—to be the focal point of 
patriotic sentiments. He wrote,
Independent of practice a single man seems to be 
peculiarly well circumstanced to superintend the 
execution of laws with discernment and decision, 
with promptitude and uniformity: the people usu-
ally point out a first man—he is to be seen in civi-
lized as well as uncivilized nations—in republics 
as well as in other governments. In every large 
collection of people there must be a visible point 
serving as a common centre in the government, 
towards which to draw their eyes and attachments. 
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The Constitution must fix a man, or a congress of 
men, superior in the opinion of the people, to the 
most popular men in the different parts of the com-
munity, else the people will be apt to divide and 
follow their respective leaders.23
The Federal Farmer’s suspicion of a government laws 
of disposed him in the direction of advocating a govern-
ment of (even a) man; his fear of demagoguery clearly 
subordinate to his fear of an aristocracy.24 Like the Anti-
Federalists who saw room for a strong executive to stand 
up to aristocratic interests, the Progressives sought a 
strong executive and an expanded merit-based bureau-
cracy that would stand up to the political machines and 
their allies in the Congress. Because Progressives under-
stood full well that a strong legislature (and House speak-
ership) and a weak executive were design features of “the 
state of courts and parties,” they saw it fit to empower the 
executive as a weapon against the party state. Like the 
Anti-Federalists, they were quite willing to deliver power 
to “a first man” so that he could protect the people against 
the “interests.”
Civic Education
Madison believed, as he wrote in Federalist 10, that “the 
latent cases of faction are thus sown in the nature of 
man.” He did not, as the Progressives did, believe in 
moralizing lectures to persuade politicians to set aside 
their self-interest for the common good because he 
believed that the way to find the common good was via 
institutions. The Anti-Federalists and Progressives resisted 
structural solutions to political problems and placed so 
much responsibility on the people and the nationally 
elected president only because they had a correspond-
ingly prominent emphasis on civic education and a civil 
religion. Mercy Warren argued that “if the education of 
youth, both public and private, is attended to, their indus-
trious and economical habits maintained, their moral char-
acter and that assemblage of virtues supported . . . there 
is not much danger that they will for a long time be sub-
jugated by the arms of foreigners.”25 As the Anti-
Federalists feared that an arrogant, power-hungry ruling 
elite in a far-flung capital would produce a subservient 
and degenerated polity, the Progressives believed that 
only a universally and well-educated citizenry can stand 
up to the corruption in the country’s high places. Civic 
education would restore and instill in citizens a commit-
ment to the public good that had been thwarted by the 
modus operandi of the party state. The Anti-Federalist 
recommendation of “seminaries of useful learning, with 
professorships of political and domestic economy” could 
just as easily have come from a Progressive reformer.26 
Like the Progressives, the Anti-Federalist also emphasized 
the instruction and learning in the social sciences, on 
“what is useful in this world—the principles of free gov-
ernment . . . the sciences of morality, agriculture, com-
merce, the management of farms and household affairs” 
because they believed that self-government could only 
work of citizens were educated and virtuous.27
Indeed, the Anti-Federalists and Progressives alike 
saw the republic itself “as a school citizenship as much as 
a scheme of government” (Storing and Dry 1981, 1:21). 
We often forget that the Anti-Federalists wanted a Bill of 
Rights not only to protect the states but also for its civic 
educative purposes. “What is the usefulness of a truth in 
theory, unless it exists constantly in the minds of the peo-
ple, and has their assent,” the Federal Farmer asked in 
advocating the Bill of Rights.28 He believed that rights 
had to be enumerated and codified because he valorized 
the “effect of education, a series of notions impressed 
upon the minds of the people by examples, precepts 
and declarations.”29 The same reasons inspired the 
Progressives to codify so many their reforms in amend-
ments to the Constitution so that citizens could transcend 
their private perspectives and perceive the collective ends 
of the community.
Cultural Homogeneity
Both the Anti-Federalists and the Progressives saw a 
moral declension in America and looked nostalgically to 
earlier days for inspiration. The moralistic tones that 
pervade their jeremiadic prescriptions reveal a deep com-
mitment to an underlying, unifying civil religion. For the 
Anti-Federalists, the victory of the American Revolution 
offered not so much a chance to create a new prosperous 
empire equal to the ones of the Old World, but an oppor-
tunity to create a republic of virtuous citizens untainted 
by corruption, greed, and lust for power (Ketcham 1986, 
3). And religion was key to the cultivation of civic virtue. 
Although the Federalists saw no need to establish a reli-
gion to support the political institutions they were creat-
ing, just as the Anti-Federalists defended the liberty of 
conscience, in general, toleration of religious diversity 
did not, in the latter’s case, typically extend to the protec-
tion of atheists. Many Anti-Federalists supported the 
religious establishments that existed in their states and 
were fearful that if the “barriers of religion” were broken, 
Americans would become, like the Europeans, “bent on 
gratification, at the expense of every moral tie.”30
Similarly, Progressivism was “a phase in the history of 
the Protestant Conscience, a latter-day Protestant revival” 
(Hofstadter [1955] 1959, 152). Like the Anti-Federalists, 
Progressives sought a renaissance of an earlier America 
whose values had not yet become corrupted by the party 
state. Many of them had a religious upbringing that 
instilled in them strongly evangelical motivations and an 
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aversion to the self-seeking mantra of the party state 
(Crunden 1982; Eisenach 1994). It was the changing face 
of American wrought by industrialization that caused 
Progressive historian Frederick Turner to “express nos-
talgia for the old order, for rural small-town America, for 
agrarian values and lifestyles.”31 Progressivism was “the 
effort to restore a type of economic individualism and 
political democracy that was widely believed to have 
existed earlier in America and to have been destroyed by 
the great corporation and the corrupt political machine” 
(Hofstadter [1955] 1959, 5). Later historians like George 
E. Mowry argued that the social group most committed to 
the Progressive program was not farmers but urban elites 
(Mowry 1951). But whether or not the modal Progressive 
was a farmer or an urban elite, she or he “looked back to 
an older America” and “sought to reaffirm the older indi-
vidualistic values in all the strata of political, economic, 
and social life” (Mowry 1951, 89).
The Anti-Federalist and Progressive reverence of the 
American civil religion meant that they were quick to 
diagnose tangible problems with spiritual causes. Both 
attributed the source of America’s problems to the dete-
rioration of the republican spirit and in particular to those 
“immersed in schemes of wealth.”32 The Impartial 
Examiner articulated the quintessential Progressive fear 
that “[i]f the nation happens to enjoy a series of prosper-
ity, voluptuousness, excessive fondness for riches, and 
luxury gain admission and establish themselves—these 
produce venality and corruption of every kind, which 
open a fatal avenue to bribery.”33 Like many Progressives, 
Cato believed that “the progress of a commercial society 
begets luxury, the parent of inequality, the foe to virtue, 
and the enemy to restraint.”34 As the Anti-Federalists ful-
minated against the commercial spirit, critics of the party 
state decried the greed of the robber barons and the venal-
ity of the bosses that had caused Americans to lose sight 
of the common good.35 The signature moral issue of 
Progressivism was, of course, Prohibition, which was 
passed as the eighteenth amendment in a bid to break the 
influence of the distilling interests on corrupt politicians—
“the saloon as a social and political institution”—as well 
as to restore the moral fabric of society as America braced 
herself for the Great War (Rumbarger 1989, 72).
There was, to be sure, a darker side to the Anti-
Federalists’ civil religion that derived from a theory of 
representation that placed a premium on “sameness.” 
For a system to be representative, the Anti-Federalists 
believed that there must be a degree of “sameness, as to 
residents and interests, between the representative and his 
constituents,” and this was possible only in a small repub-
lic.36 As Brutus similarly argued, “In a republic, the man-
ners, sentiments, and interests of the people should be 
similar. If this not be the case, there will be a constant 
clashing of opinions.”37 This theory of representation, in 
turn, assumed and prescribed a homogenous population. 
The small homogenous republic envisioned by the Anti-
Federalists had no place for foreigners because it would 
then be “composed of such heterogeneous and discordant 
principles, as would be constantly contending with each 
other.”38 Agrippa warned that because “Pennsylvania has 
chosen to receive all that would come there. . . . [She] has 
acquired her present extent and population at the expense 
of religion and good morals.”39
Even here, the Anti-Federalist legacy on the Progressives 
was profound. At a time when America was experiencing a 
new wave of immigration, the Progressives found in Anti-
Federalism a ready template for articulating and justifying 
their own nativism. Many Progressives favored immigration 
restriction because immigrants were joining the major politi-
cal parties in droves as they entered the country and sought a 
social network in which to embed themselves, thereby 
expanding both the purpose and constituency of the party 
state. This is why the Progressive sociologist Edward Ross 
complained that “the foreigners constitute an asset of the 
political machine, neutralizing the anti-machine ballots of an 
equal number of indignant intelligent American voters” 
(Ross 1914b, 275). It is also why, incidentally, most of the 
states that adopted direct democracy reforms—where the 
Progressive faith in the people was unqualified—were west-
ern states that had homogenously white populations—places 
that came closest to replicating the small republic (Schmidt 
1989; Goebel 2002; Piott 2003).
Happily consistent with their attack on the party state, 
the Progressives found affinity to and utility in the Anti-
Federalist theory of representation and their mutual 
commitment to “sameness.” Because the Progressive 
aspiration to nationalize democracy was effectively also 
to homogenize it, the assimilability of potential immi-
grants figured heavily in Progressive debates over 
immigration. Echoing the Anti-Federalists’ concern for 
“sameness,” the sociologist Edward Ross worried that 
when a country “admits to citizenship myriads of strang-
ers who have not yet passed the civic kindergarten, ques-
tions that were supposed to be settled are reopened.” As 
if he were speaking directly to Anti-Federalist concerns, 
he called these the problems of “heterogeneity” (Ross 
1914a, 397). Thus, Theodore Roosevelt supported only 
“immigration of the right kind” and the Immigration 
(Dillingham) Commission he appointed could make such 
conclusions as “it is evident that in the case of the Mexican 
he is less desirable as a citizen than as a laborer.”40
The Progressives opposed immigration because they 
were trying to deprive the party state of its lifeblood, and 
because they needed to assume that if the bosses were 
corrupt and acting against the people’s interests, then 
the people always sang in unison. Even in the area of 
immigration policy, the Progressives looked rather like 
their father’s son.
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Conclusion
We have found it difficult to define the Progressive 
movement because so many of its positive goals seemed 
inconsistent with each other. As Eisenach has observed 
of the Progressive era, “Democracy, nationalism, reli-
gion, social knowledge, and the march of social justice 
all get mixed together in ways that equally amaze and 
offend the modern liberal” (Eisenach 1994, 6). Yet if we 
focus on its negative impulse, Progressivism’s reforms 
take on a very coherent thrust indeed. Indeed, Irving 
Kristol had defined the Progressive to be “a liberal 
reformer with essentially conservative goals” (Kristol 
1996, 114). The Progressives were not so much trying to 
grant new powers to the federal government as they were 
trying to wrestle power away from the party state—a 
monstrosity so powerful and so entrenched that it admit-
tedly took what would ultimately become another behe-
moth state to take it down.
The Progressives “wanted to make a number of sharp 
changes because,” according to Henry May, “they were 
so confident in the basic rightness of things as they were” 
(May 1959, 29). And in this, they were rather like the 
Anti-Federalists. As the Anti-Federalists were wary of 
a reconfiguration of the world as they knew it, the 
Progressives were nostalgic of a world before the party 
state ruined it. Like the Anti-Federalists, the Progressives 
understood that if they wanted to attack a state, then the 
people had to be invoked. Both, then, turned to classical 
republicanism to highlight a theory of virtuous citizen-
ship to contrast it against, respectively, aristocratic or 
corrupt institutions. If Progressivism was a “lost prom-
ise” because it was never a comfortable fit with the goals 
or accomplishments of modern liberalism, it is in part 
because Progressivism’s most prominent spokespersons, 
including Vernon Parrington, whose confession opened 
this article, were disciples not just of Publius but also of 
the Federal Farmer.
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Notes
1. As a formal matter, the Anti-Federalists were “simply 
those who opposed the unamended Constitution as a pro-
posal” (Siemers 2003, 1). When New Hampshire became 
the ninth state to ratify the Constitution in June 1788, most 
Anti-Federalists acquiesced in the legitimacy of the 
Constitution and, when they did, became former Anti-
Federalists. The great majority of former Anti-Federalists 
became critics of the Washington and Adams administra-
tion and, when a new party was formed, Jeffersonian 
(or Democratic) Republicans. In this article, I use “Anti-
Federalist” rather than “Republican” to pay chronological 
respect to the former, and also to highlight the original 
aspects of the ratification debate that would engender the 
path-dependent recurrence in American history in general 
and in the Progressive era in particular.
 2. These are, in order of publication, Borden (1965), Kenyon 
(1966), Storing and Dry (1981).
 3. Patrick Henry, Summer 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 
5:213) (5.16.2).
 4. A Plebian, Spring 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 6:134-35) 
(6.11.12).
 5. The Statutes at Large of the Government of the United 
States of America from March 15, 1913 to March 15, 
1915, vol. 38 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1915), 114, emphasis added. The act begins with a 
fifty-one-page schedule of dutiable items, twenty-one 
pages on the administration of the tariffs, and devoted just 
sixteen pages to the income tax.
 6. In the party period of American politics that spanned most 
of the nineteenth century beginning in the Jacksonian era, 
parties nominated candidates who would promise to allo-
cate economic resources and privileges equally and exactly 
to all constituents of the party. Because members of 
Congress excelled in the distribution of resources, there 
was an institutional fit between the distributive politics of 
the nineteenth century and the pork-barreling instinct of 
Congress (McCormick 1988).
 7. In the late 1890s, pensions cost up to 45 percent of federal 
receipts. See Brownlee (2004, 39). Hence, Skocpol has 
argued, in ways consistent with Skowronek’s characteriza-
tion of the nineteenth-century American state, that the 
generous federal spending on Civil War pensions belied 
the conventional view that the early American state was a 
social policy laggard, but instead was part and parcel of 
the “precocious” patronage-oriented state of the nineteenth 
century (Skocpol 1992).
 8. Three other signature Progressive reforms reveal their 
primary commitment to destroying the party state and their 
secondary commitment to democracy because the fulfill-
ment of the two goals often went in opposite directions. 
These were Progressive support for the reduction of the 
total number of elected offices, the Australian ballot, and 
literacy tests. Some Progressives even advocated the 
reduction of the total number of elected offices so that it 
would vitiate the need for party competition and elections 
(Stickney 1879). Another example would be the Australian 
secret ballot, which was supported by Progressives to end 
voter fraud and intimidation but also happened to disen-
franchise illiterate voters—many of whom were African 
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American—and newly naturalized voters who could no 
longer be accompanied by a literate person to help them 
identify candidate names on a ballot (Valelly 2004, 127). 
Finally, many female suffragists like Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton and Carrie Chapman Catt also supported literacy 
tests that would effectively disenfranchise many African 
American women (Marilley 1996, 164).
 9. The Progressives were open to many other reform ideas, 
some of which never came to fruition, as long they could 
deal a blow to the party state. The Progressive economist 
and social gospelist John R. Commons, for example, 
believed that on the adoption of proportional representa-
tion of legislative districts, “most important of all, legisla-
tive bodies would be transformed from inefficient and 
corrupts bands of spoilsmen into capable, upright, and 
representative assemblies of lawmakers” (Rutherford and 
Samuels 1997, 28).
10. To be sure, the Anti-Federalists also spilled a good portion 
of ink on the inadequacy of the checks and balances pro-
vided in the proposed Constitution, implying perhaps that 
they were for more complex rather than simpler govern-
ment. But they did so only because they were taking on the 
argument on the Federalists’ terms and addressing the 
need for more safeguards even if they were to accept the 
premise of a large republic. If in a small republic, a vigi-
lant body of citizens would always ensure that no natural 
aristocracy would arise, the Anti-Federalists feared that 
there was no such self-regulating mechanism in a large 
republic and therefore proposed a stronger system of 
checks and balances than the one the Federalists had pro-
posed. This disagreement was also intensified by the fact 
that both sides had different starting assumptions about 
what needed to be checked and balanced. The Anti-
Federalists were, in the main, more concerned with bal-
ancing the natural orders of society—in particular the 
aristocratic and democratic orders—than with balancing 
the functions and powers of government as the Federalists 
were. The Anti-Federalists were more concerned with the 
tyranny of the natural aristocracy over democracy than 
with the tyranny of one particular branch over all others 
(though they recognized that some branches such as the 
Senate and the Court would be more likely to be a captive 
of aristocratic interests than others). That is why at 
the heart of many of the Anti-Federalist criticisms of the 
Constitution was its failure to secure popular responsibil-
ity. In their commitment to popular responsiveness as the 
ultimate test of a political system, we see the connection to 
and therefore the consistency in their call for more checks 
and balances in a more complex system of government in 
a large republic on one hand, and their preferred alterna-
tive of a simple government in a small republic on the 
other.
11. Denatus, Summer 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 5:262) 
(5:18.5).
12. A Columbian Patriot, 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 4:276) 
(4.28.4).
13. A (Maryland) Farmer II, Winter 1788, Storing and Dry 
(1981, 5:23) (5.1.34).
14. Centinel I, Fall 1787–Spring 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 
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16. Brutus IV, Fall 1787, Storing and Dry (1981, 2:382) 
(2.9.45).
17. Republicus, Spring 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 5:168) 
(5.13.13).
18. Cato IV, 11/8/1787, Storing and Dry (1981, 2:115) 
(2.6.30).
19. A (Maryland) Farmer IV, Spring 1788, Storing and Dry 
(1981, 5:38) (5.1.65).
20. Smith, June 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 6:157) (6.12.15).
21. A Columbia Patriot, 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 4:284) 
(4.28.12).
22. James Monroe, 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 5:298) 
(5.21.27), emphasis added.
23. Federal Farmer XIV, January 1788, Storing and Dry 
(1981, 2:310) (2.8.173).
24. The parallel to third-generation Anti-Federalists may be 
illuminating. Like the Anti-Federalists, members of the 
Confederate States of America were afraid of a powerful 
consolidated government, yet this fear did not lead them to 
weaken the powers of the confederate president. Though 
she or he was constitutionally limited to a single six-year 
term, she or he was given what we would today call a line-
item veto (article 7, section 7, clause 2) and the explicit 
power to fire any officer from any department in the 
executive branch (article 2, section 2, clause 3).
25. Warren, Storing and Dry (1981, 6:240) (6.14.157).
26. A (Maryland) Farmer, Spring 1788, Storing and Dry 
(1981, 5:50) (5.1.82).
27. A (Maryland) Farmer, Spring 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 
5:50) (5.1.82).
28. Federal Farmer XVI, Winter 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 
2:324) (2.8.196).
29. Federal Farmer XVI, Winter 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 
2:324-25) (2.8.196).
30. Warren, Storing and Dry (1981, 6:237) (6.14.148).
31. Nash (1991, 7). The Anti-Federalist and Progressive nos-
talgia for rural, small-town America, in turn, had roots 
in one-half of the court–country party distinction in 
Walpolean England espoused by Bolingbroke, Harrington, 
and others (Hutson 1981; Kramnick 1992; Elkins and 
McKitrick 1995).
32. Centinel VIII, Winter 1787, Storing and Dry (1981, 2:178) 
(2.7.126).
33. The Impartial Examiner I, Spring 1788, Storing and Dry 
(1981, 5:187-88) (5.14.15).
34. Cato V, Fall 1787, Storing and Dry (1981, 2:117) (2.6.34).
44  Political Research Quarterly 66(1)
35. It is important to note that Progressives saw political and 
financial corruption as one and the same. As John R. 
Commons observed, “The lobby and the machine have 
grown up together as Siamese Twins. The professional 
lobbyists are nearly always the managers of the political 
machine. They carry in their pockets the political fortunes 
of the legislators. The ‘third house’ is the legislature” 
(Rutherford and Samuels 1997, 25).
36. Federal Farmer XII, Winter 1788, Storing and Dry (1981, 
2:298) (2.8.158).
37. Brutus I, Fall 1787, Storing and Dry (1981, 2:369) 
(2.9.16).
38. Brutus I, Fall 1787, Storing and Dry (1981, 2:370) 
(2.9.16).
39. Agrippa IX, Winter 1787, Storing and Dry (1981, 4:86) 
(4.6.34).
40. Vought (2004, 27); U.S. Immigration Commission 
(1911), 690.
References
Aldrich, John A., and Ruth W. Grant. 1993. “The Anti-Federalists, 
the First Congress, and the First Parties.” Journal of Politics 
55:295-326.
Balogh, Brian. 2009. A Government Out of Sight: The Mys-
tery of National Authority in Nineteenth Century America. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Borden, Morton, ed. 1965. The Antifederalist Papers. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
Brooks, Roger G. 1987. “Garcia, the Seventeenth Amend-
ment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending 
Federalism.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 10: 
189-202.
Brownlee, Elliot W. 2004. Federal Taxation in America: A 
Short History. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Ceaser, James W. 1979. Presidential Selection: Theory and 
Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cornell, Saul A. 1989. “The Changing Historical Fortunes 
of the Anti-Federalists.” Northwestern University Law 
Review 70:39-74.
Corwin, Edward S. 1950. “The Passing of Dual Federalism.” 
Virginia Law Review 36:1-24.
Croly, Herbert. (1909) 1989. The Promise of American Life. 
Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Crunden, Robert M. 1982. Ministers of Reform: The Progres-
sives’ Achievement in American Civilization. New York: 
Basic Books.
Derthick, Martha, and John J. Dinan. 1999. “Progressivism and 
Federalism.” In Progressivism and the New Democracy, 
edited by Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, 81-102. 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts.
De Witt, Benjamin Parke. 1915. The Progressive Movement: A 
Non-Partisan, Comprehensive Discussion of Current Ten-
dencies in American Politics. New York: Macmillan 
Dionne, E. J. 1996. They Only Look Dead: Why Progressives 
Will Dominate the Next Political Era. New York: Simon 
& Schuster.
Eisenach, Eldon J. 1994. The Lost Promise of Progressivism. 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Elkins, Stanley, and Eric McKitrick. 1995. The Age of Federal-
ism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Ellis, Richard E. 1987. “The Persistence of Antifederalism after 
1789.” In Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitu-
tion and American National Identity, edited by Richard 
Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter, 295-314. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Ford, Henry Jones. 1898. The Rise and Growth of American Pol-
itics: A Sketch of Constitutional Development. New York: 
Macmillan.
Goebel, Thomas. 2002. A Government by the People: Direct 
Democracy in America, 1890–1940. Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press.
Graham, Otis L., Jr. 1967. An Encore for Reform: The Old Pro-
gressives and the New Deal. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Harvey, Anna L. 1996. Votes without Leverage: Women in 
American Electoral Politics, 1920–1970. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Hofstadter, Richard. (1955) 1959. The Age of Reform: From 
Bryan to FDR. New York: Knopf.
Hutson, James H. 1981. “Country, Court, and Constitution: 
Antifederalism and the Historians.” William and Mary 
Quarterly 38:337-68.
Kenyon, Cecelia, ed. 1966. The Antifederalists. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill.
Ketcham, Ralph, ed. 1986. The Anti-Federalist Papers and the 
Constitutional Convention Debates: The Clashes and Com-
promises That Gave Birth to Our Form of Government. 
New York: Penguin Putnam.
Kramnick, Isaac. 1992. Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Poli-
tics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Kristol, Irving. 1996. “When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness.” 
In The Neo-Conservative Reader, edited by Mark Gerson, 
103-115. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Link, Arthur S. (1955) 1967. American Epoch: A History of the 
United States since the 1890s. New York: Knopf.
Little, Laura E. 1991. “An Excursion into the Unchartered 
Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment.” Temple Law 
Review 64:629-58.
Lowi, Theodore. 1979. The End of Liberalism: The Second 
Republic of the United States. New York: Norton.
MacDonald, Forrest. 1963. “The Anti-Federalists, 1781–1789.” 
Wisconsin Magazine of History 46:206-14.
Mann, Arthur, ed. 1963. The Progressive Era: Liberal Renais-
sance or Liberal Failure. New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston.
Lim 45
Marcus, Robert D. 1971. Grand Old Party: Political Structure 
in the Gilded Age, 1880–1896. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Marilley, Suzanne. 1996. Women Suffrage and the Origins of 
Liberal Feminism in the United States. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
May, Henry F. 1959. The End of American Innocence: A Study 
of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912–1917. New York: 
Viking.
McCormick, Richard L. 1988. The Party Period and Public 
Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the 
Progressive Era. New York: Oxford University Press.
McGeer, Michael. 2003. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and 
Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870–1920. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
McWilliams, Wilson Carey. 1990. “The Anti-Federalists, Rep-
resentation and Party.” Northwestern Law Review 85:12-38.
Mettler, Suzanne. 1998. Dividing Citizens: Gender and Feder-
alism in New Deal Public Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Mowry, George E. 1946. Theodore Roosevelt and the Progres-
sive Movement. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Mowry, George E. 1951. The California Progressives. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Nash, Gerald. 1991. Creating the West: Historical Interpreta-
tions 1890– 1990. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press.
Parrington, Vernon L. 1927. Main Currents in American Thought: 
The Colonial Mind 1620–1800. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Piott, Steven L. 2003. Giving Voters a Voice: The Origins of the 
Initiative and Referendum in America. Columbia: Univer-
sity of Missouri Press.
Pocock, J. G. A. 1975. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Progressive Party Platform. 1912. http://teachingamericanhis-
tory.org/library/index.asp?document=607.
Rahe, Paul A. 1992. Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical 
Republicanism and the American Revolution. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press.
Ross, Edward A. 1914a. “The Immigrants and Politics: The Polit-
ical Consequences of Immigration.” Century 87:392-98.
Ross, Edward A. 1914b. The Old World in the New: The Sig-
nificance of Past and Present Immigration to the American 
People. New York: Century.
Rumbarger, John J. 1989. Profits, Power and Prohibition: Alco-
hol Reform and the Industrializing of America, 1800–1930. 
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Rutherford, Malcolm, and Warren J. Samuels, eds. 1997. John R. 
Commons: Selected Essays. New York: Routledge.
Schmidt, David. 1989. Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative 
Revolution. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Seligman, Edwin R. 1914. The Income Tax: A Study of the His-
tory, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and 
Abroad. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan.
Siemers, David J. 2003. The Antifederalists: Men of Great Faith 
and Forbearance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The 
Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building a New American State: The 
Expansion of National Administrative Capacities 1877–1920. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Daniel A., and Dustin Fridkin. 2008. “Delegating Direct 
Democracy: Interparty Legislative Competition and the 
Adoption of the Initiative in the American States.” American 
Political Science Review 102:333-50.
Smith, J. Allen. 1907. The Spirit of American Government: A 
Study of the Constitution: Its Origin, Influence and Relation 
to Democracy. New York: Macmillan.
Smith, J. Allen. 1930. Growth and Decadence of Constitutional 
Government. New York: Henry Holt. 
Stickney, Albert. 1879. A True Republic. New York: Harper & 
Brothers.
Storing, Herbert J., and Murray Dry, eds. 1981. The Complete 
Anti-Federalist. 7 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Tanger, Jacob. 1916. “Amending Procedure of Federal Consti-
tution.” American Political Science Review 10:689-99.
Tulis, Jeffrey K. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
U.S. Immigration Commission. 1911. Brief Statement of the 
Immigration Commission with Conclusions and Recommen-
dations and Views of the Minority. Vol. 5865. Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office. http://site.ebrary.com/
lib/stanfordimmigrationdillingham/Doc?id=10006604& 
pp=671.
Valelly, Richard M. 2004. The Two Reconstructions: The 
Struggle for Black Enfranchisement. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Vought, Hans P. 2004. The Bully Pulpit and the Melting Pot: 
American Presidents and the Immigrant, 1897–1933. Macon, 
GA: Mercer University Press.
Wilson, Woodrow. (1885) 1901. Congressional Government. 
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.
Wilson, Woodrow. 1913. The New Freedom. New York: Dou-
bleday, Page.
Wood, Gordon S. 1969. The Creation of the American Repub-
lic: 1776–1787. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press.
Copyright of Political Research Quarterly is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written
permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
